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ABSTRACT
ADAM KAELIN SCHOENBACHLER: Spiting Fire en Français: The Racialization of
French Hip-Hop Artists in the Media and their Responses after the Charlie Hebdo Attack
(Under the direction of Amy McDowell)

This paper explores the racialization of French Muslim hip-hop community in the context
of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, and the extent to which French rap artists were limited in
their ability to criticize the French government and secularist France in the months
following the massacre. This was accomplished by performing content analyses of the
remarks of popular French Muslim rap artists on the Charlie Hebdo Massacre and articles
from popular, accessible online French news publications covering the remarks of both
French Muslim and non-Muslim rap artists. After a careful analysis of the rappers’
remarks and the media coverage of those remarks, I determined that there was in fact an
active racialization of Muslim members of the hip-hop community in the media, and that
the rap artists in question felt constrained in their freedom of expression and their ability
to criticize popular French culture following the massacre.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION
All translations in French were conducted by the author unless otherwise noted.
Translations are denoted by brackets just after the original French.
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INTRODUCTION
"The values of the French Republic — freedom, equality, and fraternity — those are also
values that you can find in Islam. The problem isn't values. The problem is
communication.”
- Abd al Malik

To many here in the United States, the phrase “Islam in France” conjures images
of terrorist attacks and cultural conflict. Some French political figures, notably secularist
political figures, have even claimed French Muslims as an example of some
irreconcilable clash of civilizations. However, the issue is more complex than that, and it
requires the words and actions of those with a public voice to combat this gross
oversimplification. French rappers have used their voices to open that dialogue, pushing
the boundaries of their freedom of expression and working to claim a space in France for
the Muslim community. The quotation above by French rapper Abd al Malik, a Sufi
Muslim and human rights activist, speaks to my research agenda, addressing the
“problem” concerning French Muslims. The problem surrounding French Muslims has
far more to do with false perceptions, misunderstandings, and poor representations of
Muslim culture. Furthermore, both the French rap community and French secularists are
avid supporters of their independent freedom of expression, but that message is lost in the
heat of passionate controversy. In essence, the problem is communication. Rap music is
hugely popular in France, which is the number two creator and consumer of rap music in
the world (Aidi 2015). However, despite its roots as a means of expression for black and
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brown, Muslim and immigrant communities, rap music is consumed by both white
French people and French Muslims.
“Je réclame un autodafé contre ces chiens de Charlie Hebdo [I demand a bonfire
for those Charlie Hebdo dogs]!” raps Nekfeu, an up and coming white Parisian rap artist.
His lyrics were part of a posse cut—a rap song with more than four contributors—written
for the critically acclaimed 2013 film Le Marche, a documentary on the Beur’s March on
Paris. While controversial, his words echo the growing agitation of the French rap
community who, like Nekfeu, recognize a pervasive anti-Muslim sentiment in French
society led most publicly by media sources like Charlie Hebdo (Gemie 2010; Scott 2007).
Months later Akhenaton, another rapper from the Le Marche posse cut, shouts “La
France est Islamophobe [France is an islamophobe]!” on his November 2014 album, Je
suis en vie, which went on to win Rap Album of the Year at France’s national music
awards ceremony (Le figaro 2015).
In January 2015, French Muslim rapper Médine released his single, Don’t Laïk,
on which he lambasts the French government and French society at large for its
secularist, islamophobic rhetoric. He refers to both the French government and the
secular French as one singular group: “les laicards,” a term that is widely used by those in
the Muslim hip-hop community and others opposing secularist France as a slur to
negatively describe secularists in France. It is a combination of the words Laïque,
roughly translating to “secularism,” and connard, a rough obscenity that translates to
“mother fucker.” On the track, he calls for listeners to “crucifions les laicards [crucify the
secularists]” and “met un fatwa sur les cons [make a hit on the idiots.]” About a week
after the release of Médine’s protest song, two men forced their way into the Charlie

2

Hebdo offices where fifteen writers, caricaturists, and editors are having a weekly
editorial meeting. Over the course of fifteen minutes, the two men killed twelve,
including the director of publication. As they departed the building, they allegedly
shouted, “We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad. Allahu Akbar!" (BBC 2015). Al
Qaeda’s branch in Yemen claims responsibility within the week (Tourancheau 2015).
This thesis investigates how the Charlie Hebdo attack influenced media portrayals
of the rap community and explores how members of the French hip-hop community have
engaged in a dialogue with the media. By exploring this complex exchange between the
French hip-hop community and the media, this research sheds light on the greater issues
of Islamophobia and inequality in France.

Research Question
My research focuses on three main questions: How has the media portrayed
French rap artists and the larger hip-hop community in the aftermath of the 2015 Charlie
Hebdo attack? In what ways have rap artists responded to this media? And finally, to
what extent did media reactions and public sentiment after the Charlie Hebdo attack stifle
the rappers’ ability to freely express the viewpoints and concerns of French Muslims?
The goal of these questions is to better understand how Islamophobia shapes
media perceptions and the responses of the hip-hop community in France as a part of a
national response to the Charlie Hebdo attack.
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Pre-research observations
In July 2015, I spent a month living in Angers, France, studying French at
L’Université Catholique de l’Ouest. One weekend that month, I took a trip to nearby
Paris to sightsee. I arrived in Paris early on a Friday and, with a French friend I had made
in my hostel, went for a walk along the Seine river. Along the river in front of l’Hôtel de
Ville, a large municipal building in the heart of the city, a free, rather large music festival
was taking place. We stopped at the edge of the crowd just in time to see Nekfeu (the
same white French hip-hop artist who called to “burn the Charlie Hebdo dogs” in 2013)
come on stage. As he began to rap, my friend yelled over the din of the crowd and the
loud speakers, “he’s pretty good for a pale guy, no?” His comment left me thinking about
stereotypes about rap communities, stereotypes that transcend national borders. Also, I
began to see that there exists a certain expectation that rap music is something innately
black or brown, and that white people are not expected to excel in making rap music
(Forman 2000; Gladney 1995). Those that do excel are considered exceptional, such as
Eminem in the United States or Nekfeu in France. I realized that Nekfeu, as a white
Frenchman in a historically black and brown culture, does not fit the script of a rapper in
France. He is a white man acknowledged for his skill as a rap artist. He can walk in both
the world of white France and black and brown France, privileged and even made
exceptional by his race. His race is, in part, what makes him special and famous, further
extending his white privilege.
On January 7th, 2016—the one-year anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack—I
stepped off the RER B metro line in Paris with my large suitcase and backpack.
Travelling through the capital, I could see that Paris was in mourning. As a United States
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citizen, I grew up in the shadow of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and I sympathized with the
pain felt by the French. As a budding francophone, I had even changed my profile picture
on Facebook to a “Je suis Charlie” banner in solidarity with the French publication. A
month later, after settling into my apartment and making friends with some local
conservatory students, I attended a party where I was one of only two foreigners in
attendance. Walking in, I could hear angry shouting. “Fuck Charlie Hebdo! Fascistes!”
rang the voice of an inebriated Frenchman from a smoke-filled room in the back of the
apartment. I was taken aback, but later a friend of mine informed me that Charlie Hebdo
was a far more contentious subject than many of us in the United States understood.
Charlie Hebdo, a weekly publication known for its political caricatures, is a source of
controversy because of its depictions of the prophet Mohammad and its generally
insensitive characterization of religious and ethnic minorities (Taibi 2015). Throughout
the semester, I learned increasingly more about the local hip-hop community and gained
a different, more critical perspective on Charlie Hebdo.
When I returned to Mississippi for my final year of instruction, I knew that I
wanted to investigate the intersection of religion, hip-hop, and French culture. The
opportunity of a senior thesis through the Croft Institute gave me the chance to make that
investigation.

Racialization and Islamophobia
Racialization describes the means by which certain groups are formed and divided
from larger society through the identification of particular physical or cultural identifiers.
Farhad Dalal explains that it is a process by which people are “raced” in a societal
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construction, not as the recognition of an innate quality inherent in the DNA of an
individual (2002:11). Racialization, it is important to note, is based upon a given
society’s interpretation of an individual’s physical and cultural characteristics, and
likewise is affected by the visibility of those cultural and physical characteristics (Dalal
2002:12). Omi and Wynant define racialization as “the extension of racial meaning to a
previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group” (1986:14).
However, as Garner and Selod (2015) illustrate, this definition is inadequate as it implies
that racialization occurs only among predetermined groups. They forward that
racialization can be applied to preexisting groups because it does not construct identities.
Rather, they state that racialization reconstructs the popular perception of a marginalized
group (Garner and Selod 2012). By opening the definition in this way, we may
acknowledge the racialization of religious minorities like Jews, Sikhs, and Muslims.
The term racialization and the overarching idea of racism is rarely applied strictly
to religious groups. However, religious groups face a constant racialized form of
discrimination. For example, during the second World War, the German Nazi party
capitalized on rampant European anti-Semitism, a form of racialization in which Jews
were falsely attributed different and inferior physical and cultural characteristics than
white Christian Europeans (Blumenfeld 2012). As is well documented, the consequences
of Jewish racialization were horrendous. Accordingly, Garner and Selod argue that it is
very possible to “race a religion” and to speak about racism in terms of Islamophobia
(2015). In the past, other minority groups have been racialized based upon their religious
background. The collective gaze of the dominant culture constitutes the power behind the
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racialization of minority groups. In the case of Muslims, Islamophobia is the glimpse of
the results of the process of racialization (Garner and Selod 2015).
Joan Wallach Scott (2007) suggests that islamophobic sentiment in France—as
well as many other European countries—reveals itself through constructing and
identifying “problematic” elements of Islam such as “radical Islamist” sentiment,
“communitarian” tendencies, or “anti-secular” identity. By constructing these problems,
islamophobic detractors blur the line between race and religion and contrast their white,
Catholic culture against black and brown Muslim culure (Garner and Selod 2015). As
well, in a certain light, religion implies a willfully-chosen set of cultural and ethical
values that can be criticized. However, by reconstructing an identity for French Muslims,
Scott (2015) forwards that the French society extends dehumanizing yet clearly Westernfabricated and racist characteristics to Muslims. They defend their position as a reaction
to willfully-chosen religion, as opposed to race, which is not willfully chosen. Therefore,
according to Scott, detractors of Islam in France are engaging in a pseudo-racist discourse
that is simultaneously safe for detractors and harmful to the French Muslim community.

Media Coverage of Muslims
Racist and racially charged attitudes about Muslims by non-muslims, especially in
the wake of terrorist attacks, are shaped by news media interpretations and portrayals of
Muslims. According to Media Tenor, a research organization dedicated to studying
public perception of the media, the day after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, “global media
tonality when talking about Muslims and Islam dropped to an unprecedented -80%
surplus of negative news” (Media Tenor 2015). As well, they reported that in the months
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after January (contrary to expection, negative reporting about Muslims went down overall
in January), “openness for the dialogue between cultures has suffered from the
increasingly hostile reporting about migrants. Refugees are regularly framed as a threat
and burden and only very infrequently as a boon to the host societies” (Media Tenor
2015). After the November 2015 Paris shootings, Media Tenor released this statement
about their findings in 2015 in relation to the Charlie Hebdo attacks:

“Voices that refuse to equate Islam and violence are taken up more and more
rarely in the media,” explains Dr. Christian Kolmer, director of policy analysis at
Media Tenor. “While overall criticism of Islam and Muslims decreased slightly in
January 2015 after the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, there was no similar
reaction after the Parisian terrorist attacks of November.” In more than two thirds
of all reports about Muslim actors and organizations terrorism and violence are
the main aspects. “The media strategy of Islamic State with its shocking acts of
violence has so far been successful, leading to increasing anti-Muslim sentiment
all over the world – which in turn drives support for IS among alienated and
intimidated Muslims.” (2016)

As well, Ahmed and Matthes conducted a meta-analysis of 345 published studies
to analyze media representation of Muslims from 2000 to 2015. Through their research,
they determined that Muslims tend to be framed negatively, and Islam is portrayed as a
violent religion (2016). They also concluded that there was “an evident lack of
comparative research, a neglect of visuals, and a dearth of research on online media”
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(Ahmed and Matthes 2016). Their findings indicate that other research on the portrayals
of Muslims in popular media lacks comparative studies, restricts analysis mostly to
spoken and written publication, and neglects online media as a platform of analysis. For
example, many of the studies they reviewed tended to be analyses of physical print
medias and the textual excerpts of media broadcasts.

Music as a Source of Solidarity in the Face of Anti-Muslim Racism
Music communities can often become a source of solidarity for minority groups.
In Hip-hop Desis: South Asian Americans, Blackness, and a Global Race Consciousness,
Nitasha Tamar Sharma illustrates the manner in which racial and ethnic minorities in a
community will use hip-hop music to capitalize on the minority-specific qualities given
to them by their communities. Specifically, she shows how hip-hop artists use their
“immigrant sensibilities, a sense of otherness, an articulation of racial pride, and a
counter-hegemonic discourse” to formulate a formidable political front for their minority
status (2010). She focuses on individual artists of South Asian descent. These artists,
called desis, subscribe to a black global race consciousness, utilizing their independent
music styles to connect with blackness and distance themselves from whiteness. The
black global race consciousness entails the construction of a global identity, shared by
ethnic and racial groups deemed as deviant by colonial and imperial white interests.
When faced with the unfair, disparaging condition of being labeled as a deviant race,
some minority youth reclaim a black identity as an antithetical identity to the white
labels.
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There exists a global Muslim music culture in which young, disaffected Muslims
construct identity and race consciousness through defiant music scenes. Hishaam Aidi
explores this theme and others in his book Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New
Muslim Youth Culture (2014). He explains the connection between Muslim youth,
political activism, and music, explaining how black music styles such as jazz, hip-hop,
and reggae have become tools for building community and organizing political protest
among Muslim youth. Furthermore, Aidi explores how the conversation about European
Muslims has shifted from a dialogue about race to a dialogue about religion. This
dialogue paints European Muslims as barbaric Islamists in a clean, secular Europe, yet in
reality this is a thinly-veiled mode for white Europeans to racialize the Muslim minorities
(2014). In response, Muslim music communities band together to express their solidarity
and discontent through music. From jazz to hip-hop and trance music, these Muslim
music communities utilize a variety of styles to represent their unity.
Research also suggests that a body of panethnic, American youth have utilized
Taqwacore punk rock—a specifically Muslim genre of hardcore punk music—as a means
of finding solidarity and resisting anti-Muslim racism (McDowell 2016). Specifically,
Taqwacore punks use their music to underscore their identity as “brown kids” and to keep
whiteness—which they see as a problem—out of their punk music. To Taqwacore punks,
whiteness—and by extension, white punk—stands for “racially dominant groups and
ideas as well as Western imperialism, Christian supremacy, and everyday practices of
racial and religious exclusion” (McDowell 2016:5).
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Methods
The bulk of my research relies upon online news media portrayals of French
rappers and the hip-hop community before and after the Charlie Hebdo attack. I chose to
center my analysis on conscious rap artists and rappers that may not identify as conscious
rappers, but draw on elements of conscious rap in their work. Conscious rap is politically
charged rap in France that often critiques the French state. It functions as a more direct
voice for immigrant voices, and defends their interests, but as a result of this, most all of
the conscious rappers are underground and relatively unpopular. The bulk of my analysis
concerns the most famous artists, who are not necessarily considered solely conscious
rappers but received an abundance of press coverage for their activism (which would be
considered an element of conscious rap).
The Charlie Hebdo attack represents a particularly useful point in time for
analysis because of the particularly controversial position the publication held and its
rocky rapport with rap artists before the attack. Furthermore, studies show that the public
perception of and discourse about Muslims after terrorist attacks carried out by Muslims
is particularly negative (Media Tenor 2015). I consulted news articles, dating from
January 7, 2016 until June 7, 2016, that covered the remarks of various French rappers
for the victims, families, and communities affected by the Charlie Hebdo shootings.
These reports came from news sources from all across the range of political spectrum, but
more importantly, they were news sources easily accessible to any French person,
representing the most commonly read online sources of daily and weekly news.
Referencing the CIA Open Source Center’s guide to French Media, I was able to
determine the political skew of my sources and to obtain a reference for the most read
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publications of the day (Open Source Center 2008). This allowed me to analyze a wide
range of political skews and to get a feeling for the exposure a typical French person
would have to news medias, representing as many viewpoints as this medium of research
allows. Specifically, the sources were Le Figaro, Le Parisien, Le Monde, Mouv’, L’Obs
Magazine, Le Point, Gala Magazine, 20 Minutes, La Dépêche, Libération, Téléstar, and
Ouest France (N=12).
To understand the media’s portrayal of Muslim hip-hop artists, I started by
searching each of my 12 publications for specific phrases and words like “Charlie
Hebdo” and rappeur”. From this initial search, I collected 20 articles for analysis. In
addition to these, I obtained social media publications, videos, and transcripts of the rap
artists’ remarks after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. These sources of the rappers’ remarks
against news reports. This allowed me to see how reporters selectively reported on the
actual words of the rappers. Conversely, I used sources of rappers’ remarks in the sixmonth timeframe after the Charlie Hebdo attack—taken from news articles, videos, and
social media posts by rappers—also allows me to examined how Muslim hip-hop artists
respond to the media’s coverage of the hip-hop community. To accomplish this, I
examined the content of these rappers’ remarks for repeated words, phrases, and ideas
that perhaps constitute an organized front among the responses of French rappers.
As my search progressed, I began to find links and references to hip-hop news
sites, which I found to have the most empathetic and accurate reporting of the rap
community. In their compassionate viewpoints, these sources became a foil for racially
biased publications. The hip-hop news sites were less likely to take the remarks of
rappers out of context than other mainstream publications. I felt it imperative to include
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them in my analysis because, as writers for niche publications, the authors of these
articles are more intimately associated with the hip-hop community and therefore offered
a grassroots, insider view of what it is like to be part of hip-hop after the Charlie Hebdo
attacks.
Originally, I had intended to look for news publications one month from the
Charlie Hebdo attacks, but instead I chose to look for sources six months out from the
Charlie Hebdo attacks because as some rappers released albums over the following
months, they would also release comments about the Charlie Hebdo massacres and react
to media portrayals of Muslim communities and rap communities. For example, when
French rapper Booba released his album D.U.C. on April 13, 2015, over four months
after the Charlie Hebdo attack, he made the comment, “quand on joue avec le feu, on se
brûle” [when you play with fire, you get burned.] As well, I used the direct transcriptions
of post-Charlie Hebdo statements of six famous French rappers: Disiz, Nekfeu, Medine,
Diam’s, Booba, and Kery James. Disiz’s comments were taken from his Facebook post.
Nekfeu’s comments were pulled from a report by Ici.fr. Medine’s comments were pulled
from his Facebook page and direct reports from Lefigaro.com. Diam’s remarks were
taken directly from her Facebook page. Booba’s remarks were taken from his Twitter
account, and a combination of 13dorduhiphop.com and Leparisien.com’s direct reports.
Kery James’s comments were taken from a direct report from Negronews.fr.
Coding of the data proceeded in two phases: open and closed coding. To create
open codes, I closely read news reports and direct sources of rappers’ apologies,
highlighting and formulating all present concepts and themes and those suggested by the
material, regardless of their evidence for or against my research (Emerson, Fretz, and
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Shaw 1995). Next, I formed closed codes by connecting the ideas present in the open
codes, creating broader, overarching themes and discussing them. In this way, I analyzed
the data in two parts: one about the manner in which the media racializes hip-hop artists,
and one about how those hip-hop communities respond to racialization. For example, as a
reaction to racialization, I created the code “fear of retaliation” and included instances
where hip-hop artists made reference to fears of the retaliation from the media,
government, etc…
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FRENCH HIP-HOP AND SECULARISM

Islam Versus Laïcité in France
As a result of centuries of imperializing other peoples, France is home to a highly
diverse population. The Arab population in France, totaling nearly 5 million people and
comprising roughly 7.5 percent of the population (Hackett 2016), is particularly large, a
result of France’s colonization of large areas of Africa and the Middle East. The majority
of these people are culturally Muslim or practicing Muslims (Hackett 2016). Yet these
Muslims have not been warmly welcomed by the secular, white population in France.
There exists a definitive view of what it means to be French, and culturally Muslims do
not fit that mold (Mamou 2016). Traditionally, the French ascribe national values to the
French devise [motto]: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité [Liberty, Equality, Fraternity], but also
they adhere to a firm division of church and state, a national secularism called laïcité. The
most un-French characteristic of the Arabic immigrants is their religion, Islam.
According to a 2010 Eurobarometer poll, only 27 percent of the French population
believes in a god, making the country one of the most secular places in the world
(Eurobarometer 2010). Roughly translating to “secular-ness,” laïcité is written into
Article 1 of the French Constitution, which states that “France shall be an indivisible,
secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before
the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs”
(Constitution 1997). As well, this idea of laïcité is reified by the 1905 Law on the
Separation of Churches and State. However, the context of this law is important in
understanding the origins of the laïcité tradition. Prior to 1905, France was required to
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impose the moral truth of the Catholic pope and the Vatican onto its subjects via the 1864
Syllabus and the 1870 Papal Infallibility Decree (Decherf 2001). By passing the 1905
law, France expanded freedom of religion by presenting a clear separation of church and
state. Today, some scholars forward that laïcité has ironically come to mean something
far different from its original, tolerant purpose; it has become an invasive mandate
against the public expression of religion, but more specifically, Islam (Zaretsky 2016).
French legislation against publicly expressed religion often targets practicing
Muslims. On March 15, 2004, the French Parlement passed legislation banning religious
symbols in public schools, and, more specifically, “the wearing of signs or clothing
which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations” such as “a large cross, a
veil, or a skullcap” (Scott 2007:1). Despite the ban’s inclusive language, it was designed
to target the Muslim hijab, burqa, and niqab—symbols interpreted by the French
lawmakers as being antithetical to the French ideal of equality (Scott 2007). These head
and body coverings, referred to by law makers and the general French media as “la voile”
[the veil], are interpreted as a physical representation of resistance to the separation of
church and state, an insistence upon differences in an indivisible nation, and a symbol of
women’s subordination (Scott 2007). French lawmakers interpret these symbols without
input from the Muslim communities they attempt to define. In the terminology of Edward
Said, French lawmakers are engaging in an orientalist discourse, furthering an
islamophobic, ethnocentric, and nationalist narrative about Muslim symbols and culture
by creating a racialized Other—a distinctly French caricature of Muslim culture—without
the consent of the Other (Said 1978). French lawmakers are exercising their hegemonic
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authority over the French Muslim underclass by redefining the symbols of their culture in
a way that only truly exists in the minds of the lawmakers.
Muslims in France have become a prime target for discrimination. Studies have
shown that “a Muslim candidate is 2.5 times less likely to receive a job interview
callback than is his or her Christian counterpart [...] and that second-generation Muslim
households in France have lower income compared with matched Christian households”
(Adida 2010). This religious disparity is indicative of the national feeling that to be a
Muslim is to fall short of being truly French. As well, journalist Leighton Walter Kille
and John Wihbey, a journalism professor at Northwestern University, highlight that
“research from INSEE, France’s national statistical agency, indicates that in 2013, the
unemployment rate for all immigrants was approximately 17.3%, nearly 80% higher than
the non-immigrant rate of 9.7%, and descendants of immigrants from Africa have a
significantly more difficult time finding work” (2013: npg). Clearly, French Muslims
constitute an underclass in French society.

Rap Music in France
Born in the Bronx in the mid-1970s, hip-hop culture and rap music was originally
the product of disenfranchised, poor, and urban minority voices of the 1970s (Hahn 2014;
Forman 2000; Morgan and Bennet 2011). Early rap artists made passionate music
detailing the hardships of American ghettos and the institutionalized racial oppression of
the day. The burgeoning popularity of hip-hop brought to light the conditions of inner
cities of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles; places defined by their blackness and
wracked by social strife (Forman 2000). Hip-hop is commonly divided into four or five
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artistic mediums by those who study or practice the art. (1) deejaying and turntablism, (2)
the construction and delivery of rap music, (3) break dancing and other forms of hip-hop
dance, (4) graffiti art, and (5) a united system of knowledge about rap music (Morgan and
Bennett 2011). In the United States, rap music became innately political and powerful in
a nation still reeling from the Civil Rights Era, and became enormously popular in the
1980s and 1990s (Gladney 1995). Hip-hop has become a global force, becoming a global
form of resistance to white hegemony (Sharma 2010). Along with a variety of other
music forms, many non-white communities utilize a variety of black music forms—like
jazz and reggae in addition to rap music—as a means of self-expression and to create
distinctively non-white spaces through protest (Aidi 2014).
French leaders embraced hip-hop in the 1980s, believing that France’s emergent,
troubled, and increasingly immigrant youth could be empowered by expressing the
various frustrations of a struggling underclass in society (Prévos 1996). In a post-colonial
context, hip-hop became a means of resisting racial oppression because of its strong
ability to formulate non-white identities and facilitate the growth of those identities
(Auzanneau 2001). Jack Lang, the French Minister of Culture (1981 to 1986 and 1988 to
1992), invited American hip-hop artists like Afrika Bambaataa and the Zulu Nation to
come to France and share their music through workshops and performances (Prevos
2002). By the 1990s, French hip-hop had become a source of French pride. Lang
famously said that hip-hop was "intellectually, morally and artistically” a movement, and
that “even if in the beginning [hip-hop] drew inspiration from America, I believe it has
found its originality here in France” (Meghelli 2013). Hip-hop appealed to France’s
enormous population of disaffected, second and third-generation Muslims who related to
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African-American struggles across the Atlantic (Prevos 2002), and French rappers
redefined hip-hop as a unique, distinctly French form of expression. For young, nonwhite Francophones, rap music became central to the creation of their identities, allowing
a cultural space for the creation of an urban, underdog identity (Auzanneau 2001).
Furthermore, rap music became an outlet for the anxieties, fears, and hopes of non-white,
subordinated groups in francophone society (Auzanneau 2001).
Today, France is the world’s second largest consumer and producer of rap music
(NPR staff 2015). The French government endorses and funds the production of hip-hop
culture, particularly rap music. Recently, French tax monies paid for the construction of
“La Place” in Paris, a massive public center that funds and encourages underground art
forms and hip-hop artists.1 It is designed to be the centerpiece of the new “Canopée des
Halles,” a billion-euro urban redevelopment project to redefine one of Paris’ least
attractive and most dangerous underground stations in the middle of the city (Crossman
2016). In addition to paying tribute to Paris as a world center of hip-hop culture, “La
Place” provides large spaces for performances and modern studios for the production of
rap music. It should be noted however that the studio space is neither free nor cheap to
rent, ironically creating considerable barriers to the production of an art form historically
created by the underprivileged. However, there is a dearth of research on the impact of
French public funding on the arts and more specifically spaces like La Place. Essentially,
there is a lot about this that we do not know.
The French government’s investment in “La Place” seems to contradict some of
its previous actions toward the hip-hop community. For example, French rapper Black M

1

http://laplace.paris/
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had his invitation to play at a ceremony for the 100-year anniversary of the Battle of
Verdun revoked. Critics accused him of being “Anti-France” because of criticisms of
France in his lyrics. Marine Le Pen’s coalition in French parliament stated, “Black M
must not appear in Verdun. During this butchery that bled Europe dry, 163,000 French
soldiers perished and 216,000 others were wounded. All these soldiers were ‘Kuffars’2,
of the ancient people of France. At best, Black M scorns them; at worst, he hates them”
(Le Monde 2015). The lyrics referred to com from Black M’s song, Désolé, where he
calls France “un pays de kuffars [a country of non-Muslim miscreants].” His detractors,
such as Marine Le Pen of the ultra-nationalist National Front party, insisted that his
participation in the ceremony would amount to “spitting on a war memorial.” This,
despite the fact that Black M’s great-grandfather had participated in the Battle of Verdun
as a member of African regiment and that he had declared himself “a proud citizen of the
republic” (Cross 2016). After the invitation to perform was revoked, the National Front
party and several other far right and white nationalist movements rejoiced, lauding the
government’s stance against hip-hop cultures.
In their search for place and meaning, many French Muslims have created a
specific cultural identity based around and rooted in their cultural Otherness, and it shows
in their music. Muslim French rappers empathized with African Americans and began to
emulate their styles as early as the 1980s. Prévos (1996) remarks:

In songs and albums recorded by French rappers in the late 1980s, several
reproduce themes encountered in recordings of popular American and

2

This is an Arabic word indicating a non-Muslim miscreant.
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African-American artists of the period. French rappers likewise express
opposition to the social order and to political and economic systems which
have led to what they call the "oppression" of minorities (Arab immigrants
in particular). French rappers tell about the hardships of everyday life in
the poorer suburbs which they often characterize as le ghetto..

In this way, rap music became both a popular function of Muslim youth identity and a
way to speak out about the inequalities that plague Islamic communities. The raps are
often incredibly controversial, calling out public officials as “legal crooks” and using
violent and crude language to pose attacks against French government, army, public
servants and even France itself (Prévos 1996). Even today, twenty years after the
publication of Prévos’ article, French rappers like Sexion d’Assaut, Nekfeu, and Abd Al
Malik are making aggressive political stands about subjects like Islamophobia, police
brutality, and government corruption in their music. A group of politically-active rappers
has collectively formed to create a sub-genre called conscious rap (Sar 2017).
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

In the wake of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, the French media focused much of
its reporting on the reactions of French rap artists to the attacks. This was understandable
given the turbulent relationship between hip-hop artists and the caricaturists at Charlie
Hebdo. In 2013—before the Charlie Hebdo attack, but after the 2011 firebombing of the
Charlie Hebdo offices—rapper Nekfeu called for “un autodafé contre ces chiens de
Charlie Hebdo [a bonfire for these Charlie Hebdo dogs]” in a song he co-wrote for the
film Le Marche (20 Minutes, Les Rappeurs Nekfeu et Disiz). As well, rapper Médine
released a song just days before the attacks entitled “Don’t Laïk,” condemning France for
using its secularist policies to discriminate against Muslims. In this song, Médine calls us
to “crucifions les laicards [crucify the secularists]” and declares a “fatwa sur les cons3 [hit
on the idiots.]” However, the French media stereotyped the rappers and condescended the
rappers’ remarks after the event, contorting and redefining the sentiment of their words.
Shortly after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, there was an outpouring of remarks from
the hip-hop community. Rappers who had previously raged against the islamophobic
caricatures of Charlie Hebdo came out with apologies for their contrarian remarks and
lyrics. However, the remarks of these rappers were often far more than just apologies.
Some, like Nekfeu and Medine, balanced their apology with a defense of their freedom to
speak freely about the position of the French Muslim minority. This was coupled with

3

“Fatwa” is an Arabic word which literally describes an authoritative opinion on an
aspect of Islamic law. However, in the context of French hip-hop, it describes a public
call for death or a “hit” on someone.
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their acknowledgement of the satirical nature of rap music. In a videotaped interview
with Le Parisien (2015), Nekfeu said the following:

Après les événements horribles qui se sont passés, je me prends un vent de
gens qui me reprochent ce qu'il s'est passé. Je me suis senti dans un
premier temps coupable. Et ensuite je me suis senti con. Aujourd'hui je
regrette d'avoir employé des termes qu'on peut me reprocher. Et d'avoir
desservi ce que je voulais dire qui est un message de paix et d'amour entre
les gens. […] Je n'avais pas écrit ça au moment des caricatures mais après
une énième Une de Charlie Hebdo, que je ne lisais pas mais que je
considérais fait par des gens du même camp que moi, humaniste. Et je les
trouvais irrespectueux et limite indignes de ce qu'ils portaient comme
message [...] Sémantiquement parlant, je me suis permis de pousser la
provoc plus loin que j'aurais du [...] J'en ai dit plein des conneries. Mais je
n'ai jamais eu l'habitude d'être relayé en tant que porte parole. [After the
passing of these horrible events, I was tested by the people who accuse me
of that which is in the past. For the first time, I felt guilty. And then I felt
like an ass. Today I am sorry to have used words that can reproach me.
And to have harmed that which I would like to say, which is a message of
peace and love among people. […] I had not written it at the time of the
caricatures but after the umpteenth one of Charlie Hebdo, that I wasn't
reading but I thought made by people from the same camp that me,
humanist. And I thought they were disrespectful and had a disgraceful
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limit to that which they wore as their message [...] semantically speaking, I
permit myself to push the provocation further than I would have [...] I
have said plenty of bullshit. But I have never had the intention of being
relayed as spokesperson.]

Here, Nekfeu, as a white Frenchman in hip-hop, is apologizing for having been mistaken
as a spokesperson for the Muslim community in France. In acknowledging how harmful
his remarks were, he also acknowledges his position as a privileged individual. His
apology distances himself from the stigma and the burden of being considered a member
of the Muslim hip-hop community. He is also calling out Charlie Hebdo for their
caricatures and defending his own position by claiming to push the boundaries of what
should or should not be said. In effect, he is defending his freedom to critique Charlie
Hebdo by premising his remarks with an apology. Medine (2015) wrote the following on
his Facebook page in the days after the attacks:

Suite à l’extrême violence qui s’est abattue aujourd’hui à Paris, je tiens à
témoigner tout mon soutien aux familles des victimes. Je condamne
évidemment profondément ce type d’actes et ce depuis 10 ans à travers ma
démarche artistique. […] Par ailleurs, si la satire est omniprésente dans
mes albums et notamment dans mes derniers morceaux, à l’encontre des
différentes formes d’extrémisme (religieux, politique et philosophique), ça
n’est que pour rendre le débat serein et équilibré. La provocation n’a
d’utilité que pour identifier certains phénomènes pervers, que sont tous les
types de fondamentalisme, et dans le but de mieux s’en prémunir. Mes
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morceaux appartiennent à cette tradition d’œuvre caricaturiste qui exagère
volontairement les représentations pour en extraire son contenu parfois
absurde et contradictoire. [Following the extreme violence that occurred in
Paris today, I would like to testify all my support to the families of the
victims. I condemn obviously and deeply this type of act in these past 10
years through my artistic approach. […] In addition, if satire is
omnipresent in my albums and in particular my latest songs, against the
different forms of extremism (religious, political and philosophical), it is
only to make the debate calm and balanced. The provocation is only used
to identify some perverse phenomena, that are all types of
fundamentalism, and in the aim to better protect against fundamentalism.
My songs belong to this tradition of work which cartoonist voluntarily
exaggerates the representations to extract the content (of extremism)
which is sometimes absurd and contradictory.

Here, Medine is justifying his work by claiming the same caricaturist’s card as Charlie
Hebdo. As well, he is defending his position by claiming that he is against all
extremisms, not just secularism However, Medine’s apology is far more cautious than
Nekfeu’s. It conveys self-preservation through a clarification of his work, whereas
Nekfeu, a white artist, was able to comment on his past remarks with more defiance.
Others like rappers Kery James, a French Muslim rapper born to Haitian parents, and
Disiz, another French Muslim rapper, released lengthy statements detailing the
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experience of being a Muslim in France and their fears arising from the attacks. On
Facebook, rapper Diam’s (2015) said:

Je suis Française, je suis musulmane et je suis affligée. Je m'indigne de
toutes les barbaries perpétrées ici et là au nom de l'Islam. Je crains qu'une
porte ne se soit ouverte de haine mutuelle, de violence... Des fous agissent,
du sang coule et c'est bien plus de gens qu'on ne pense qui sont touchés.
L'islam interdit le terrorisme et appelle à la paix et non à la terreur. L'islam
n'enseigne pas la vengeance ni le meurtre mais appelle à propager la
lumière du bien et de l'excellence dans le comportement. [I am French, I
am Muslim, and I am afflicted. I am indignant of the perpetrated
barbarism here and there in the name of Islam. I fear that a door is open to
mutual hate, to violence… From this crazy act, blood flows and far more
people than one would think are affected. Islam forbids terrorism and calls
to peace and not to terror. Islam does not teach vengeance or killing but
calls to spread the good light and excellence through behavior.]

Diam’s is using her Facebook as an informative tool, attempting to show other people
how her religion, Islam, does not condone these acts. She speaks for the Muslim
community, hinting at the fear of the Muslim community and stating that “far more
people than one would think are affected.” As well, rapper Kery James released a
statement to a number of major news sources in the days after the attacks, stating the
following:
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La grande majorité des musulmans dont je fais partie est également
victime et otage des extrêmes de tout bord. Et c’est à elle à qu’on ordonne
constamment de donner des gages de citoyenneté et de patriotisme qui ne
semblent jamais suffisants. C’est d’elle qu’on exige sur un ton presque
menaçant qu’elle descende dans les rues pour prouver son attachement à la
France. Comme si finalement c’était elle qui avait financé et armé les
terroristes. Les temps qui vont venir vont être difficiles pour nous et notre
patience va être mise à rude épreuve. [The vast majority of Muslims of
which I am a part is also a victim and hostage to the extremes of either
side. And it is that majority that is directed constantly to provide proof of
citizenship and patriotism which never seem sufficient. (Muslims) are
required in an almost threatening tone to drop into the streets to
demonstrate their commitment to France. Finally, it is as if it was Islam
who had financed and armed terrorists. The time which will come will be
difficult for us and our patience will be put to the test.]

Kery James, like Diam’s, is attempting to speak for the Muslim community at large,
communicating the disadvantaged position of Muslims in French society. He speaks to
the authoritarian control exacted by the dominant group, white French people, on French
Muslims, who are never able to shed the stigma of their religion. In explaining that the
majority of Muslims are caught in between the secularist French and extremist Muslim
camps, Kery James elucidates how compromising the position of Muslims can be.
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Hip-hop’s Relationship with Charlie Hebdo Before the Attack
Charlie Hebdo has been known for its controversial cartoons for a while, and has
been criticized for its depictions of Mohammad since 2006 when the magazine featured a
weeping Mohammad saying “C’est dur d’être aimé par des cons” [It’s hard being loved
by jerks] on the cover (see Figure 1) (Taibi 2015). Shortly after the publication of this
edition, Charlie Hebdo was sued by the Grand Mosque of Paris, the Muslim World
League, and the Union of French Islamic Organizations for inciting racial hatred and
defamation. Charlie Hebdo won the case (Communauté 2007). Later in 2011, Charlie
Hebdo released an edition entitled “Charia Hebdo,” a reference to sharia law, in which
Mohammad is depicted saying, “100 coups de fouet, si vous n’étés pas morts de rire!
[100 lashes, if you do not die of laughter!]” (Taibi 2015). The representation of
Mohammad on this cover is particularly disturbing as it features a long nose, unkempt
facial hair, and a deranged smile. These traits are classic tropes of dehumanization, and in
particular applied to Muslims in Western society (Arjana 2015). The Charlie Hebdo
offices were firebombed later that same year. Aside from its lewd portrayal of
Mohammad, the publication has also received backlash for its lewd portrayals of Jewish
stereotypes and Catholic stereotypes (see figures 3 and 4). Charlie Hebdo’s usual
depiction of Jewish people as infirm is particularly disturbing as it calls back to Nazi
propaganda’s usage of disease imagery to caricature Jewish citizens (Al-Shaikh-Ali
2015). Yet the official stance of the publication is anti-racist. They claim:

“Nous n'avons pas peur d'avouer que nous sommes des militants
antiracistes de toujours. Sans nécessairement avoir une carte, nous avons
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choisi dans ce domaine notre camp, et n'en changerons évidemment
jamais. Si par extraordinaire – mais cela n'arrivera pas – un mot ou un
dessin racistes venaient à être publiés dans notre hebdomadaire, nous le
quitterions à l'instant, et avec fracas.” [we are not afraid to confess that we
have always been militant anti-racists. Without necessarily having a
membership card, we have chosen our position in this camp, and we aren’t
ever changing direction. If by extraordinary circumstance—but this will
never happen—a racist word or drawing were published in our weekly
publication, we would remove it immediately and resoundingly.]
(Charbonnier and Nicolino 2013).

The dissonance between Charlie Hebdo’s comments here and the virulently islamophobic
and racist caricatures appearing regularly on the cover of Charlie Hebdo’s publication
suggest that the Charlie Hebdo does not consider its position racist, but rather secularly
seated in dark humor. However, many others do not see the editorial in the same light.
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Figure 1
“Mohammad overwhelmed by Fundamentalists” and a caricature of Mohammad
saying, “It’s hard to be loved by jerks.”

Figure 2
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“Charia Hebdo Special Edition” and a caricature of Mohammad saying, “100
lashes if you don’t die of laughter.”

Figure 3
“The ‘gay lobby’ in conclave. Then, the smoke, it comes?”

Figure 4
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“Untouchables 2” depicting a Sikh and a Jewish man saying “[you] should not
laugh!”

Figure 5
Charlie Hebdo’s cover after the “Egyptian killings.” “The Qu’ran is shit. It
doesn’t stop bullets.”

The hip-hop community in France has long taken issue with Charlie Hebdo’s
portrayals of Muslims and Black French, and accordingly, they have positioned
themselves against the publication and its hyper-secular stance (Aidi 2015). Recalling to
the introduction of this thesis, in 2013, a group of elite French rappers recorded a posse
cut (a single rap track with more than four contributors) entitled “March” for a film
commemorating the 1983 March for Equality and Against Racism. On the track, a
relative newcomer named Nekfeu, a white rapper in his 20s, called for “un autodafe
contre ces chiens de Charlie Hebdo” [a public burning of these Charlie Hebdo dogs]
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(Chapon 2015). Just after the attack, the same rapper defended his remarks from 2013,
calling them a defense of freedom of expression in the same caricaturist’s tone as Charlie
Hebdo. However, he immediately followed these remarks saying, “I've considered
Charlie Hebdo's recent editorial line to be opportunistic and degrading towards the
Muslim community” (Aidi 2015).

Reframing Condolences and Refuting Anger
There are many cases in which the French media attempted to reframe the
remarks of French rappers as solely apologies, either by omitting everything but an
apology from their statements or by only emphasizing the apology sections of their
statements. For example, the conservative French publication, Le Parisien, a publication
with a large readership comparable to Fox News in the United States, published a short
article on the condolences of rapper Nekfeu entitled “Le mea culpa d’un rappeur,” [the
mea culpa of a rapper] insinuating that Nekfeu was making a grand apology in his
remarks about the attacks. While he did apologize for his lyrics against Charlie Hebdo,
Nekfeu’s comments were far more than just an apology. He also defended his own
position by defending his freedom of expression and accused Charlie Hebdo of furthering
Islamophobia and hate in France. However, Le Parisien chose to make their article
instead about his apology, insisting upon the rapper’s “mea culpa.” Furthermore, the
article quotes his grievance with Charlie Hebdo, “Je considérais la ligne de Charlie
Hebdo comme opportuniste et dégradante envers la communauté musulmane dans un
contexte d'islamophobie” [I consider Charlie Hebdo’s publications to be opportunistic
and degrading toward the Muslim community in an islamophobic context,] yet goes on to
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note that Nekfeu himself does not belong to any religious community himself, as if to
delegitimize his claim to speak out in opposition to anti-Muslim racism. Then the article
finishes saying, “la formule en question résonne dans ma cœur avec regret” [the lyrics in
question resound in my heart with regret,] guiding his words back to this idea of regret
and apology. This is not the only article that uses the idea of Nekfeu’s “mea culpa” as a
central theme. By reframing his remarks as an apology, Le Parisien is implying that the
hip-hop community and Muslims should apologize for the Charlie Hebdo. However, by
emphasizing that Nekfeu is not a Muslim, Le Parisien is using Nekfeu as an example of
what should be done, but not as a representative of the Muslim community. This is even
more interesting because his pre-attack remarks and lyrics were by far the most
incendiary—the line calling for “un autodafe contre ces chiens de Charlie Hebdo” [a
public burning of these Charlie Hebdo dogs] was mentioned in the majority of articles
and in every article that mentioned Nekfeu. He is being used as an example of a good,
secular and repentant member of the hip-hop community.

Focus on Rappers’ Religious Affiliations
Rappers expressed a variety of concerns in their reactions to the Charlie Hebdo
attack, speaking sometimes on behalf of Muslim communities, sometimes out of concern
for their own safety, even sometimes expressing shame and regret for their past words. In
several publications, there were strict attention to the religious affiliation of the rappers
featured in each piece. Along with the name of a rapper, his or her religious affiliation is
tacked on, sometimes followed by a statement of when the specific rapper converted to
Islam or became disaffected with religion. Some articles even established the religious
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beliefs of rappers in the title. For example, an article in Libération was entitled “Médine:
Le Vengeur Mosquée4 [Médine: The Mosqued Avenger].” By identifying the religious
affiliation of each rapper, the author guides the identification of the rapper with Islam,
therefore inviting whatever prejudice or judgement comes along with that identification.
Furthermore, it serves to disenfranchise rappers by disqualifying their remarks as
members of the Muslim community or as non-members of the Muslim community. The
magazine L’Obs reported in an article the religious statuses of two subjects within the
first few paragraphs. The journalist reported, “Diam's, convertie à l'islam en 2008, a
appelé à ne pas se laisser "prendre au jeu diabolique de l'escalade des haines" ou
Youssoupha, musulman également, a apporté son soutien aux familles des victimes.
[Diam’s converted to Islam in 2008, called to not let ourselves “take to the evil game of
escalating hate” or Youssoupha, also a Muslim, offered his help to the families of
victims].” By attracting attention to the religious affiliations of each rapper, the author
tints the words of those he or she is reporting about. It is almost always irrelevant
information to the story, but it does serve to paint the apologetic rappers as “exemplary”
members of a group racialized as degenerate. It seems to be a particular obsession with
the religion of the rappers’ religion. This is also seen in various reports about rapper
Nekfeu, but to an opposite effect. The highlighting of his lack of religious affiliation
obviously disaffiliates him from the Muslim community he is attempting to defend and
represent through his remarks and music. Through disaffiliation, Nekfeu no longer has a
representational ground to stand on, and his remarks are seemingly disqualified.

4

This is a play on words. Instead of the “masked avenger,” the author refers to Médine as
the “mosqued avenger.”
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Shaming Rappers
Some journalists spoke about the silence of the rap community following the
Charlie Hebdo attack, calling the lack of apologies to Charlie Hebdo on behalf of the hiphop community an embarrassment. In an article entitled “Les rappeurs gênés par
d’anciens propos sur ‘Charlie Hebdo’ [The rappers embarrassed by previous remarks on
‘Charlie Hebdo’],” journalist Oliver Cachin said, “pour la plupart des artistes de hip-hop,
il y a une grande gêne" car ils avaient pour la plupart "au mieux de l'indifférence pour
Charlie [for the majority of hip-hop artists, this is a great embarrassment because for the
most part they are indifferent about Charlie Hebdo]." Later, in an article from Le Point,
he says this is because, hip-hop being a Muslim art form where the majority of rappers
are Muslims, the hip-hop community had an obligation to respond on behalf of the
Islamic community (Le Point 2015). In another article from Le Monde, the author states
that rappers have an obligation to apologize or react to the attacks because they speak on
behalf of the Muslim community.
Much of the journalism surrounding rappers Booba and Médine was wildly racist.
Particularly, the media has attacked the song “Don’t Laïk” by Médine. The song is
incredibly graphic, featuring a heavy, gritty beat and lyrics such as “Marianne est une
femen tatouée "Fuck God" sur les mamelles [Marianne is a Femen with "Fuck God"
tattooed on the breasts.] The chorus of the song encapsulates the overarching meaning of
his position. He raps:

Ta barbe, rebeu, dans ce pays c'est Don't Laïk
Ton voile, ma sœur, dans ce pays c'est Don't Laïk
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Ta foi nigga dans ce pays c'est Don't Laïk
Madame monsieur, votre couple est Don't Laïk
On ira tous au paradis, tous au paradis on ira
On ira tous au paradis, tous au paradis incha'Allah
On ira tous au paradis, tous au paradis on ira
On ira tous au paradis, enfin seulement ceux qui y croient
[Your beard, arab, in this country it is Don’t Laïk
Your veil, my sister, in this country it is Don’t Laïk
Your faith nigga in this country it is Don’t Laïk
We’ll all go to heaven, to heaven we’ll all go
We’ll all go to heaven, to heaven we’ll all go God willing
We’ll all go to heaven, to heaven we’ll all go
We’ll all go to heaven, at least the ones who believe in it.]

One article mused that perhaps Médine is an enemy of the republic for his song “Don’t
Laïk” (La Redaction 2015). Other articles castigated Médine for his damning language on
“Don’t Laïk,” heavily criticizing his position as a defender of French Muslims (Cespedes
2015). For rapper Booba, much of the reporting on his remark after the Charlie Hebdo
attack (“When we play with fire, we burn”) takes place in a racist and islamophobic
manner. In one article, a journalist made the insinuation that Booba is too stupid for his
own good (Le Parisien 2015). Likewise, many articles use the words of radio personality
Patrick Pelloux to juxtapose the remarks of Booba. Yet Patrick Pelloux makes no
argument of his own other than to talk down to Booba, saying, “[il] ferait mieux de
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chercher l'intelligence plutôt que de chercher à justifier les terroristes [He would do well
to search for intelligence rather than search to justify terrorists]” (Delacroix 2015).

Fear of Retaliation, Conflations, and “La Polémique”
Many of the rappers from the conscious rap scene expressed fear in some way or
another following the Charlie Hebdo attack. In a lengthy Facebook post, rapper Disiz
stated that he feared for his children and country in the aftermath of the attack. Having
grown up in a post-9/11 world, he fears the same experience for his children in a postCharlie Hebdo France, constantly having to justify their religion, repent for a crime they
did not commit, and fear the establishment under which they live. Disiz stated his fears
plainly, giving a long and fearless statement about racism, French Muslim identity, and
the sad state of France in the wake of terrorism and xenophobia. As well, Rapper Kery
James wrote an open letter that was published in a variety of online media outlets. In his
letter, he expressed his experience of being a French Muslim and the variety of fears that
come along with that life. In his letter, published by the Negro News Network, he said:

Après ce 7 janvier 2015, une fois encore, j’ai la sensation que les choses
évoluent trop vite et que ma vie et mes choix m’échappent. Je crois que ce
sentiment est partagé par l’immense majorité des musulmans et des gens
conscients des enjeux auxquels nous devons faire face [After this January
7th 2015 [the date of the Charlie Hebdo attack], once again, I had the
sensation that things were evolving too quickly and that my life and my
choices escaped my reality. I believe that this sentiment is shared by the
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immense majority of Muslims and those who are conscious of that which
we must cope with] (Negronews 2015).

His letter and his attempt at sharing his experiences publicly indicate the kinds of
pressures and fears French Muslims are forced to live with in the wake of terrorism. In
particular, the fear of losing control and a sense of French Muslim solidarity is expressed
throughout his remarks, ultimately ending in a warning against stereotyping others.
However, after the Charlie Hebdo attack there exists a general sense that rappers
were distinctly afraid of being drawn into the fight between secularism and Islam, and
therefore chose to stay quiet. Over time, the articles revealed a theme of fear among
rappers. The two phrases used most often to describe the fear of rap artists were “craintes
de l’amalgame [fears of the conflation]” and “un peur de s’impliquer dans la polemique
[a fear of becoming involved in the controversy]” or some variation of these. These fears
describe firstly a fear of being conflated with terrorists, and secondly, a fear of being
dragged into the conflict between Islam (and by extension, the hip-hop community) and
secularist France. This fear is exacerbated by hip-hop journalists, celebrities, and
reporters who publicly slander artists who come out opposing secularism such as Booba,
Nekfeu, and Medine.
The first phrase, “craintes de l’amalgame [fears of the conflation],” generally
describes rappers fears of being lumped in with terrorists or Political Islam by the media
or the public.i However, the word “amalgame” does not translate well into English, and
neither does the sentiment that it attempts to portray. Roughly, it describes
misrepresentation, but as an established misrepresentation of Muslim rappers and regular,
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non-violent Muslims as being terrorists. Nearly always, the word l’amalgame describes
the specific instance of misrepresentation. Rapper Akhenaton’s remarks to the newspaper
Le Figaro clarify the meaning of “les amalgames.” He said, “Mahomet avec les doigts
crochus sur une Europe couverte de tombes chrétiennes, c'est de l'amalgame. On nous dit
maintenant ‘ne faites pas d'amalgames’, mais les amalgames sont faits! [Mohammad with
his fingers hooked around a Europe covered in the graves of Christians, this is the
conflation (l’amalgame). We all are told, ‘don’t make conflations, but the conflations are
made!]” (Le Figaro 2015). Another facet of this fear of conflation comes to light in
rapper Médine’s response to a request from the journal Le Monde for an interview. He
replied, "Je doute que le contexte permette d’avoir un quelconque dialogue serein autour
de cette question [I doubt that the context permits us having any calm dialogue about this
question]" (Mouv’ 2015). The fear of conflation is not only a fear of misrepresentation,
but it is also an acknowledgement of the inevitability of being twisted by the media and
public.
The second phrase, “un peur de s’impliquer dans la polemique [a fear of
becoming involved in the controversy],” seems to embody nearly the same meaning as
“craintes de l’amalgame [fears of the conflation],” but it implies that there is an existing
conflict between the rap community and the media. Often when rappers express this fear,
they speak of “la polemique [the controversy]” as a misunderstanding of the media and
the public about the nature of rap music. Rapper Nekfeu’s response to the Charlie Hebdo
attack expresses this feeling on behalf of rappers. He said, “je suis juste un rappeur
sincère issu du monde des clash : une discipline où les figures de style violentes ne sont
jamais à prendre au pied de la lettre [I’m just a sincere rapper from the world of clash: a
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discipline where the violent stylistic figures are never to be taken literally]” (Mouv’
2015). In the hip-hop community, violent lyrics are often understood to be a part of the
rap tradition where rappers are often appraised on their ability to use hyperbole as a
figure of their expression (Calvert et al. 2014). By pointing out the violent structure of
hip-hop, Nekfeu highlights how his lyrics were never meant to be taken literally. He uses
this point as a defense of his expression.

Freedom of Expression
It would seem that the remarks made against the rap community combined with
the fear they expressed through their remarks would keep the rap community from freely
expressing their discontent. Many of the rappers expressed a fear that their freedom of
speech would be compromised in the aftermath of the attack. However, it seems that the
reality is actually the opposite. It seems that members of the “conscious rap” community
have been emboldened by the mandate. Particularly, rap group La Rumeur, rapper Abd
Al Malik, and rapper Médine have been very outspoken in the months after the attack.
In the Summer of 2015, Médine released his ninth album Démineur, which
included his controversial track “Don’t Laïk” unedited, despite outrage at its release. As
well, he continued to speak powerfully about the plight of French Muslims with renewed
vigor in the month following the attack (Rabaté 2015). After releasing a statement on the
Charlie Hebdo massacres, conscious rapper group La Rumeur went on to begin
production of a film entitled Les Derniers Parisiens about the difficulty of life as a
Muslim in Paris (Binet 2015). Later in 2015, rapper Abd Al Malik released his most
thought provoking album to date, Scarifications, detailing his experience as a Muslim and
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spreading awareness to the situation of French Muslims. It does not seem to be the case
that the rappers were stifled in their expression, despite their concerns.
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CONCLUSION
When I began this paper, I sought to answer three questions: How has the media
portrayed French rap artists and the larger hip-hop community in the wake of the attacks
on Charlie Hebdo? In what ways have rap artists reacted to this media? And to what
extent did this mainstream media stifle the rappers’ freedom of expression?
Through a content analysis of a variety of accessible online French news
publications and the remarks of several rappers in response to the Charlie Hebdo attack, I
saw a variety of islamophobic remarks and attitudes in the most popular French
journalism on the hip-hop community. I found that there was a clear intent to whitewash
the sentiment of rappers’ remarks. The anger of rap artists was either edited out from
their remarks or reported and played down. By suppressing the anger of the rap artists,
the media publications I studied effectively stigmatized Muslim voices and perspectives
in France. It is worth noting that the most vocal and reported rapper I studied was
Nekfeu, a white, secular Frenchman. This attests to his ability to transcend culture
barriers via his white privilege. Other rappers were given far more one-dimensional roles,
portrayed with less kindness and given fewer chances of redemption than Nekfeu. The
journalists tended to focus on the religion (or non-religion) of rappers, loading their
statements by designating the rappers’ religious identities as news-worthy. Journalists in
particular profiled Muslim rappers by their religion. Furthermore, journalists tended to
make broad generalizations about rap being made solely by and for Muslims. I found that
there was a tendency to report about rappers using condescending language and reference
sources that outright shamed or insulted the intelligence of rappers. However, there did
not seem to be significant evidence to suggest that political skew affected the degree of
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racialization by the publications; meaning that racialization is not a political issue, but is
perhaps a broader facet of French society.
The attack made it hard for most members of the French hip-hop community, save
for the most famous and privileged rappers, to speak out against abusive French
secularism, nationalist politics, and French Islamophobia. When the more privileged and
famous rappers, like Nekfeu and Abd Al Malik, ventured to speak out against the attacks,
they coupled these remarks with condemnations of French secularism and in doing so
made claims on French values, democracy, and freedom of expression. Other less
privileged hip-hop artists posted on social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook,
writing messages against Islamophobia and censorship. Many Muslim rappers, like Kery
James and Disiz, were emboldened by the moment to share their personal experiences as
Muslims in the face of Islamophobia. Yet some of the rappers opted to keep quiet about
the attack because they feared that mainstream media would use their words against
them. But this silence proved damning. Members of the media shamed the hip-hop
community for its silence. Hip-hop journalists like Olivier Cachin decried the hip-hop
community for its timidity. Many national French news publications reconfigured the
various remarks of rappers as apologies rather than defenses their work and freedom to
criticize what they see as unjust. Journalists censored the anger of the rappers, controlling
the sentiment of their remarks after the Charlie Hebdo attack. In censoring the actions
and words of the rappers, the journalists played the islamophobic role that the rappers
were often critiquing.
This research fits into the larger picture of research on Islamophobia and
racialization, expanding a growing body of literature on the subject. However,
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sociologists of music and popular culture have largely overlooked French popular culture.
By examining popular culture in France, my research offers a lens into how mainstream
media coverage and condemnation of conscious rap music may have a hand in shaping
islamophobic and anti-immigration attitudes among the wider French public. As well,
this thesis supports a growing body of research on media attention toward Muslims in
music communities. This scholarship shows that the French hip-hop community—and by
extension the French Islamic community—face a variety of islamophobic and racist
challenges from the French media and society in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack,
putting into perspective the remarks, lyrics, and actions of these French hip-hop artists
around that time. Hopefully, this further highlights the convoluted and intractable
situation which French Muslims and hip-hop artists are forced to navigate.
It would be interesting to conduct interviews with the rappers themselves, directly
providing insight into the perceptions and experiences of rap artists rather than attempting
to interpret existing material. As well, it would be interesting to pursue interviews with
French rap audiences to see how hip-hop is being interpreted by actual French people
with secular viewpoints.
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I use the words “Political Islam” because “Fundamentalist Islam” incorrectly carries the
connotation that terrorism and violence are fundaments of Islamic belief (Kumar, 2012.)
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